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Introduction
This paper was developed out of an interest in the Cuban experience described by some
as the ‘‘social miracle.” The goal is to determine the scope of the effects the revolutionary
government has had on the racial landscape of Cuba since 1959. My original hypothesis was
that though many of the revolutionary government’s race policies have clearly had successes in
some sectors of the economy, I believed that some policies actually allowed or even caused
racial differences to remain present in the Cuban society. Under Marxist ideology race and color
should disappear as distinguishing factors in a society once economic and social equality have
been achieved, but as will be demonstrated, economic and social equality was never completely
achieved and some policies directly tied to race were maintained.
Therefore, in order to adequately understand the shifts in the Cuban social landscape, I
have decided to closely examine three distinct periods of Cuban history. The first period will
begin with the first encounters of race on the Cuban island when the first slaves were brought to
work sugarcane fields. The timeline will be followed all the way through the winning of
independence from Spain, through the U.S. occupation, and then up to Castro’s rise to power.
Due to the length of the time period the focus will be on the events which most affected the
perceptions of racial identity in Cuba. It is very important to understand the racial landscape of
the country when Castro took power in order to objectively study the effects his government
have had on the society. In order to see these changes a strong understanding of the continuity of
ideas relating to race must be maintained throughout the study. Many of the attitudes relating to
race have been in existence for the entire history of the country and it would be unfair to suggest
that Castro’s policies should have been immediately capable of eradicating racism due to its
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depth in the Cuban society. This depth has been created by four hundred years of exposure to
racial differences.
The second period will include the period from when Castro took power on January 1,
1959 to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. The focus of this chapter will be to study Castro’s
original reactions to the race question and look at the specific policies he and his leadership
adopted to allow the economy to create a race-less society. The chapter will give a balanced
view of the progress of the Castro administration in dealing with race, as well as a look at his
remarkable use of foreign policy to broadcast the successes ofthe Cuban miracle and to export it
to the world. The first thirty years of the Castro administration were by far his most successful
in completing the goals of creating a classless and race-less society, but these successes were
also contrasted by various digressions on policy or rhetoric in order to maintain a consolidated
support base.
The last section will focus on what is called the Special Period which refers to the
economic crisis that ensued due to the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. This goal of the third
section is to determine if Castro’s “race-less” society could maintain the same levels of equality
during a time of economic hardship. A special attention to the distribution ofjobs and dollars
due to the opening of the tourist industry should reveal the depth of the racial issue and the areas
where, no matter what progress has been made,there still remains a strong since of racial
distinction on the island. Furthermore, recent census data as well as certain state policies aimed
at controlling the flow of immigration within the country should provide evidence for an ironic
attention to race in a society where it is claimed that race no longer exists. It is important to
study this period to see how far Castro and his administration can carry their policies during a
time of high pressure from the struggling economy.
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Chapter 1
Cuba Before Castro: How the Race Question Developed
In order to develop a full understanding of the Cuban climate when Castro came to power
it is important to understand how the Cubans developed their sense of racial identity. Castro
developed his race policy based on the successes and failures of colonial and national models of
identity that had grown out of the context of slavery and the fight for independence. The
“raceless” Cuba that Castro envisioned was not, in fact, an original idea. Since the Cuban
independence wars, the nationalistic tendency towards a unified Cuban race had been idealized
in political rhetoric. The great divide between white and black Cuba had been drawn since the
first Africans were brought to the island. For all of Cuban history after this initial encounter, the
race question became central to Cuban politics and economics and affected almost every aspect
of Cuban life. A study of the depth of the race issue on the island is crucial for an understanding
of the extent to which Castro was able to eliminate race in Cuba through his socialist economic
policies.
Black and white Cubans began to develop their senses of racial identity immediately
upon arrival of the first African slaves as early as the sixteenth century. The race question,
which can be defined as “the attempt, usually by whites of various political affiliations, to
ascribe the role that Cubans of African descent and their culture will play in a Cuban nation,”^
did not become a central factor in the Cuban social landscape, though, until the nineteenth
century. This phenomenon occurred due to the fact that the number of Africans was so low that
it had little or no impact on the social makeup ofthe country. Therefore, the three periods that
seem most important to explore include the expansion of the sugar industry in the nineteenth
Perez, Louis A. Jr. Slaves. Sugar. & Colonial Society: Travel Accounts of Cuba, 1801-1899 . Wilmington: Scholarly
Resources Inc., 1992. xv.
^ Sawyer, Mark Q. Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 38.
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century, the wars for independence, and the first half ofthe twentieth century leading up to the
Revolution and Castro’s rise to power. These three periods dramatically shaped Cuban identity
by placing the two groups into new political, social, and economic roles that changed the way
they saw themselves and the other. These events set the stage for the Castro regime and
determined almost every aspect of his decision-making and politics.
The Reign of King Sugar
The arrival of the first Africans marked a major turning point in the political, economic,
and social development of the country. This original encounter between the Spanish and Creole
elites and the African slaves became the basis for all thought on racial identity for the next three
decades ofthe country’s history. The oppressed, submissive position of the African contrasted
by the white, elite European created a very clear picture ofthe way in which the two groups
would perceive each other and relate to each other in the new Spanish colony. These encounters
were not quickly forgotten and set the stage for a long struggle to define what it meant to be

Cuban.
For the first two centuries in which slaves were recorded on the island they maintained a
much different position than that of the famous canero that worked in the sugar fields. The
original slaves were used to a much greater extent in the mansion households of the urban
aristocracy. These slaves had a much different lifestyle than the rural sugarcane workers. The
families of the aristocratic colonizers kept slaves around the house much more similarly to the
Europeans, in which they kept the slaves well-fed, clean, and dressed in their households. Many
times the slaves were almost considered family members and would take on the family name.^
This original dynamic could have been indicative of the future of race relations in Cuba in which

^ Perez. Slaves, xu.
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the Afro-Cubans are included (even given the same name), but they still remain subordinate to
whites. For the first two hundred years in which slaves were on the island, there was a very low
number of Afro-Cubans compared to the late nineteenth century and the present. The number
was almost negligible as a factor in Cuban society, especially when compared to other Latin
American nations. At the end of the seventeenth century, for example there were only 40,000
African descendents on the island, compared to over 400,000 in the Afro-Haitian population at
the time."^
That number would dramatically change over the next two hundred years as Cuba
quickly became a classic Latin American monoculture (single crop dependence) based on sugar
exports.^ The setting was perfect for Cuba to become a major sugar producer. In 1791, a major
slave uprising in St. Domingue (present-day Haiti) caused the Haitian sugar production to almost
disappear completely. Until the Haitian crash, it had been one of the largest producers of sugar,
coffee and cacao in the world. The world market was laid out in Cuba’s favor begging for a
major increase of sugar production as its supplies were low and prices were high. Cuban sugar
estates began rapidly increasing in size and number as they grew from 529 in 1792 to 1,000 in
1827, and skyrocketed to 2,430 in 1862. The production of sugar grew from 19,000 tons in 1792
to 446,000 tons in 1861.^ The number of slaves grew with the increase in sugar plantations.
Census data lists a growth from 39,000 slaves in 1974 to 436,000 in 1841. A total of more than
600,000 slaves were brought to the island in the nineteenth century alone.^ In fact, during the

^ Keen, Benjamin and Keith Haynes. A History of Latin America. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company
2004. 206.
^ Keen and Haynes. 206.
Perez. Slaves, xv.
^ Saney, Isaac. Cuba: A Revolution in Motion. New York: Zed Books Ltd 2004. 96.
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twenty years between 1841 and 1861, there was a majority African population on the island.
«9

Thus,“King Sugar was enthroned ‘dripping with the blood of Africans.

This massive influx of

Africans to the island brought with it the first major contact with the race question the island
would face.
The slave years in Cuba were important in shaping the history of the roles of whites and
blacks on the island. The actual plantation owners lived far from their estates in Havana,
10

Santiago, or Matanzas where they could find large mansions,

The estate was actually run by an

overseer and the slaves. This general hierarchy creates an interesting foreshadowing to the way
class relations are aligned in Cuba today. A small group of aristocratic Spanish proprietors
owned the land and controlled sugar production, thus they controlled the entire island. The
beginnings of the effects of the sugar economy on the race situation were already becoming
apparent.
Furthermore, the way in which slaves were treated and acted on the plantations is very
important in shaping the Afro-Cuban identity. A British traveler recounted the story of a visit to
a Cuban sugar plantation where he found three Africans in stocks. He was told that the two men
were being punished for the crime of vagrancy and the young boy had stolen eggs. The boy had
been sent from another estate to be punished by the overseer ofthe larger estate. The three had
been in stocks every night for two months in a damp,cold comer in the dead of winter with only
their shirts as coverings against the temperature. Furthermore, slaves were underfed and highly
overworked. On most plantations slaves would only be allowed to sleep for four hours during
the harvest season and only received two meals a day consisting of tasajo (beefjerky)for one

Perez. Slaves, xv.
®10Saney. 96.
Perez. Slaves. 43.
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meal and six plantains and some Indian com for the second.*' Through the process of slavery,
the slave’s mind is shaped to see the white Cuban as the oppressor and master, but he was also
the provider of what little was given to the slave.
Another important element of the race question that developed during these years was a
certain element offear among the white power base toweirds the growing African population.
,,12

“The image of savage spirits loomed large in the Creole imagination,

This fear came as a

result of stories of slave revolts in other Caribbean nations such as Haiti as well as various
smaller slave revolts in Cuba itself These smaller revolts occurred as early as 1533, a revolt in
which captured rebels were decapitated and had their heard put on display as common practice to
threaten against future revolts. The revolts, though, continued throughout the nineteenth century.
the most famous of which included one led by a woman named Carlota in 1843 whose name was
used in honor as the name of the 1975 Cuban Operation Carlota into Angola. The second ofthe
most famous revolts occurred in 1844 in which mmors that slaves, free blacks, and a few whites
were plotting a coup to create a republic founded on equality for all. The rumors were squelched
by a mass arrest by Spanish authorities of over four thousand in which hundreds were killed in a
repression that came to be known as La Escalera (the ladder) because rebels were tied to ladders
13

and beaten until they talked,

Therefore, the periods in which Africans were in the majority of

the population were particularly terrifying to the Spanish powers that be. Also, any form of
African unification was seen as very threatening to the Spanish control. Africans were forced to
denounce any type of African religion and claim Christianity. In response, though, the Africans

11

Perez. Slaves. 48-49.

12

Perez, Louis A. Jr. On Becoming Cuban: Identity. Nationality, and Culture. Chapel Hill and London: The University
of North Carolina Press 1999. 89.
13

Saney. 97.
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secretly used the Christian symbols and saints as symbolic versions oftheir own gods and
symbols. These “African-derived religions became a profound unifying influence, preserving
and transmitting culture and traditions that have remained vibrant to the present, leaving a
„I4

profound imprint on Cuba.

Saney’s use of the term “imprint” is an excellent description ofthe affects the presence of
the Africans and the cultures that accompanied them. Even while the Spanish authorities were
outlawing African religions in order to protect and maintain a purely European culture, the
Africans were taking the Catholic symbols given to them and using them for symbols oftheir
own religion. The mixture that was created was purely Cuban built out of historic context and
geographical place. The development of a completely new culture had begun right under the
watchful eye of the Spanish authorities and it was a culture that was a result of this new mixture
of races that had been created and as a result manifested itself on the island.
Defining Independence through the Independence Wars
The Cuban wars for independence generated the second major change in the status of
Africans in the Cuban society. The wars created a new nationalism within Cuba that had to be
defined as a free Spain in Cuba or a free Cuba. Furthermore, there was the issue of how AfroCubans would fit into a new Cuba. There was an interesting set of goals aligned to set the stage
for the independence struggles. The white Cubans began to experience uneasiness towards
Spanish authority and due to increased travel began to see the successes of free democratic
15

institutions especially within the United States.

The Afro-Cubans began to look for ways to

use the nationalist movement to work towards their own goals of freedom and equality in order

Saney. 96-97.
Perez, Jr. On Becoming Cuban. 89.
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to ensure their place in the new social order that would rise from independence.*^ This fight
proved to be an interesting one historically for Afro-Cubans due to the close relation between
their goals for freedom and social equality that could be approached through an overarching
national agenda.*^ This combination of goals allowed black and white Cubans to fight the same
war on the same team, even if for different goals which would lead to a much larger role for
black people on the Cuban stage.
This combined fighting began as early as the very first Cuban insurrection when Carlos
Manuel Cespedes freed and armed the slaves on his plantation and brought them to join in the
fight for Cuban independence on October 10, 1868. Cespedes and his followers fought under his
political manifesto, the Grito de Yara, in which he stated,“We only want to be free and equal, as
the Creator intended all mankind to be...we believe that all men were created equal” and he also
was in favor of“the gradual, indemnified emancipation of slaves.” Shortly after the formation of
his team of followers, he and his army camped at the Maceo farm owned by a free black man and
his mulatta wife. They contributed one of Afro-Cuba’s greatest heroes in history in their son.
18

Antonio Maceo, the “Bronze Titan” of Cuban independence.
So, for the first time in Cuban history, an Afro-Cuban was becoming widely recognized
and was playing a role on a much larger scale than any black in the history of the island. Also,
blacks were fighting as equals alongside whites in the battles constituting over 70% of the Cuban
19

army in each of the three major independence wars.

This participation and inclusion of Afro-

Cubans in the independence struggles is crucial to the understanding of the race question’s
Heig, Aline. Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Strueele for Equality. Chapel Hill and London: The University of
North Carolina Press 1995 15.
Helg. 4.
18

Dosal, Paul J. Cuba Libre: A Brief History of Cuba. Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, In. 2006.
Sawyer. 39.
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application to the wars for independence. The important factor is that the Creole elites knew that
they must have the support of black Cuba in order to win the wars for independence and were
therefore welcoming to their military participation, but they were much less enthusiastic about
20

the future of free Afro-Cubans in an independent Cuba.
Therefore, the white elites welcomed the Zanjon Pact after the Ten Years War. The pact
was not much more than a cease-fire and amnesty that included a few promises for social and
economic reforms. The pact was not at all substantial enough for Marti and his followers who
continued to fight for a year after the Ten Years War. Finally, six years after the first war for
21

independence, slavery was formally abolished by the Spanish government,

This new freedom

for Afro-Cuba created a massive change in the identity picture and military leaders, politicians,
and writers all began trying to best define a Cuban nation that consisted of two races.
The most famous author to emerge from the period was, of course, Jose Marti. Marti
developed a concept of a raceless Cuba. His goal was to unite all Cubans regardless of class or
race.«22 Upon seeing the effects of abolition and watching the growing support for Antonio
Maceo, many white Cubans began to fear that they might have rather remained a Spanish Cuba
than risk turning into an African one. Marti’s ideas towards a united Cuba also foreshadow the
future of political race rhetoric in Cuba. His concept of nation building is basically that, “blacks
??23

could be admitted into the formulation of nation on terms of equality as defined by whites.
The elimination of race to Marti, it seems, was highly contingent upon the elimination of any
Black Nationalism or unity for the sake of black unity. One of his more famous quotes that is

20

Sawyer. 39.

21

Saney. 98.
22

Saney. 98.
23

Sawyer. 40.
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referenced in almost all literature on the matter reads,“The black man who proclaims his race,
even if mistakenly as a way to proclaim spiritual identity with all races,justifies and provokes
,,24

white racism.

This concept of the black man never “proclaiming his race” is repeated

constantly in the race dialogue white Cuba. The idea stems from a belief that if race is denied,
then eventually,“Afro-Cubans would disappear through whitening in the new Cuba, and would
„25

be genetically and culturally incorporated into a white and modem nation.
This discourse would continue to be followed throughout the second war for independence.
Quickly gaining notoriety again in what came to be called the Cry of Baragua, Maceo
and his army marched from the Oriente province where there was a much greater concentration
of Afro-Cubans towards the white-dominated west ofthe country winning many battles along the
way. His renown grew quickly on the island as well as in the United States. His ability to
mobilize support, especially in the black community, began to greatly concern the white power
base. Salvador Cisneros, a white president of the civilian government was worried that Maceo
had plans to eventually take over the country. He said Maceo,“considers himself as the unique
„26

chief, not only of Oriente but perhaps of all of Cuba. Oh human miseries and ambitions!

It

was less important to Cisneros(and most of the aristocracy) that Maceo was winning battles and
was more worried about losing control ofthe country to the savage Africans that were becoming
so alarmingly popular.
A new respect was required for the rise ofthe African population, even if nothing more
than a verbal one, as a powerful force, but whites maintained their powerful hold on the top of
the ladder. This position allowed them to make whatever verbal concessions necessary, but still
Perez Jr. On Becoming Cuban. 91.
Sawyer. 41.
26

Helg. 74.
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Stifle the black voice by arguments against cultural diversity because “white” was really the only
allowable culture. Perez makes an outstanding point that is also referenced by Sawyer,“Cuba
could not, under these circumstances, but default to racial categories, organized around
assumptions of racial hierarchies in which white assumed a racelessness as it enjoyed a privilege
,,27

of whiteness, while Cubans of color were obliged to obtain ‘equality’,

The scene was set in

which the white elites began to verbally include “all races” in the Cuban nation while setting
policies and creating literature and propaganda that supported a much more exclusive
Cubanidad.
The Republican Period
The last period of time that affected Cuban race relations before Castro is the period
between the end of the second war for independence and Castro s rise to power. Three key
segments of the period include the US occupation, the implementation of Morua law and
Castro’s revolution. Though this period does not have exactly the same power as the older
history in shaping the major perceptions of race in Cuba, it does have the greatest proximity to
the period in which Castro was in power and influenced the climate in which he found the
country when he took power.
The US occupation took a heavy toll on the progress that had been made through the
independence wars. The US propaganda had portrayed the two wars, especially the second, as
being led by savage, racist black insurgents. In a story regarding Maceo s death in the second
war. Harper's Weekly felt ‘assured that the death of Maceo was favorable to the revolution
28

because it averted the danger of a race war.’

27

Perez. 91 and Sawyer. 40.
28

Sawyer. 42-43.

The new US officials took it upon themselves to
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rid the country of all of the dangerous rebels that had fought so bravely for its independence. It
set up the Rural Guard, remarkably devoid of Afro-Cubans through a system of merit based on
property ownership and literacy, whose job it was to “eliminate banditry and put down the
,,29

agitators who began to grow restive at the presence ofthe Americans.
Also, the provincial governor and his staff were very effective in manipulating the black
leaders from the independence wars into lesser positions in which they would have little to no
influence and be much less of a threat. The white leadership was then to rule in whichever way
it chose because it had brought the most powerful voices they could identify under its own
personal control. This control was further maintained by the limitation of suffrage to only adult
males who owned at least $250 worth of property. The Secretary of War ofthe time, Elihu Root,
claimed that, “limited suffrage [effectively excluded] so great a proportion of the elements which
„30

have brought ruin to Haiti and San Domingo.
The US government officials continued to enforce repressive measures aimed at breaking
down any kind of unification that was occurring among Afro-Cubans. These measures were
carried out in the form of taking away anything that pertained to African culture. The Rural
Guard as well as the police forces within the cities was encouraged to remove anything that was
used in any form ofSanteria (an African religious system), brujeria (witchcraft), and
31

naniguismo (participation in secret societies),

All ofthese measures were in response to the

beliefs and directions of the racial liberal, Fernando Ortiz. Ortiz believed and widely propagated
that all separation between the races was a result of culture and that every race could graduate to
that of the Anglo-Saxon through cultivation and teaching. The “black primitivism explained
29

Keen and Haynes. 427.
30

Keen and Haynes. 428.
Helg. 112.
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black and white criminality in Cuba: Criminality was a result of the primitive African, who was
,,32
altogether incapable of moral discernment.
But, as segregation continued in the educational and social arena, the black Cuban
community began looking outside of Cuba for answers to their need for representation. Rafael
Serra, a friend of Marti’s from his exile in New York, encouraged Afro-Cubans to build
organizations with the goal of moving forward. These ideas became a reality in the form of the
Partido Independendiente de Color. Evaristo Estenoz formed the political party advocating free
education, state control of private schools, abolition ofthe death penalty, reform of the criminal
justice system, and an end to the ban on nonwhite immigration. In response, the legislature
created an electoral amendment called the Monia Law in 1911, that made black political parties
illegal, in order to justify a massive arrest of 200 PIC members.
The party turned militant as a result, and planned a massive protest in the Oriente
Province in 1912. The Cuban government quickly and harshly destroyed the protest,

Police and

militias made up of white citizens organized for the sole purpose of breaking up the protests
killed more than 4,000 Afro-Cubans in the repression. The actions were applauded by a few
white Cuban press organizations some even supporting the organization of secret militant groups
like the Ku Klux Klan. The response was greatly divided between both white and black
politicians. The black congressman,for whom the Moriia law had been named,signed a
33
declaration proclaiming that there was no racial discrimination in Cuba.
Again, the repressive actions ofthe whites were justified through claims that the
organization was anti-Cuban and racist. The new racial equality message, in effect, licensed

Sawyer. 44.
Sawyer. 45-46.
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whites to do almost anything they deemed necessary to maintain power because,'‘the myth
served to brand as racist any attempts by blacks to organize separately to protest racial
1^34

discrimination.

The laws and the propaganda was written in such a way so that there was no

way that blacks could gain any ground because whites could always claim in some way that they
were acting against the raceless Cuban principles. Thus,the concept of the whites continuing to
be given the luxury of remaining white and the blacks being forced to learn to be white in order
to hold up the raceless society maintained its stranglehold on the country’s social stage.
In the years leading up to Castro’s rise to power, there is interesting evidence of a
repetition of the way in which Afro-Cubans first were given the chance to participate in Cuban
society. The whites had become tired of a poorly governed economy and the blacks latched onto
the general direction of white public opinion to advance their own cause. Juan Almeida, a black
Cuban, who still maintains a position in Castro’s inner circle stated, I joined primarily because I
felt the need to do something for my people, my country, and thereby eliminate this damned
racial discrimination."^^ Again also, interestingly enough, Castro utilizes the black power force

to

achieve his personal goals to take power and then becomes very quiet on the race issue upon
arriving in office. “Castro and his followers attempted to treat blacks as clients of the revolution
and to contain their growing power and influence, maintaining the regime s image as a champion
,»36

of blacks without causing fear and alienation among whites,

Castro was so intent upon

playing into the politics of both groups that some parts of his movement even utilized racist

Helg. 106.
Sawyer. 53.
Sawyer. S3.

17

caricatures of Batista, a mulatto, to build white support for the revolution. These cartoons called
„37

Batista “el mulatto malo” and “the black beast.

The revolution was not entirely difficult for Castro. He was able to come in at a time in
which the white elites had grown weary of Batista and his failing economic policies. He was
further able to exploit the ways in which Batista had failed the Afro-Cubans and promise an
economy in which equality would be the key to its success. These most recent occurrences
coupled with the troubled racial history of Cuba created an environment for radical change to
take place, but it would not be an easy change or an immediate change. “The regime of Fidel
Castro forged a racial ideology that was based upon the pre-existing Cuban attitudes toward race,
the practical circumstances of the moment, and a new vision for Cuba, combining old attitudes
,,38

with a new state ideology: Marxism.

37

De la Fuente, Alejandro. A Nation for All: Race. Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth Century Cuba. Chapel Hill &
London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 253.
38

Sawyer. 49.

18

Chapter 2
Race Policy from 1959-1989
Many social scientists have found that racism is clearly manifested differently from one
country to the next. Racial ideologies are created and affected by many factors including history,
politics, class structure, and culture that combine to form individual perceptions of race and
create very distinct ideologies about how to combat racial discrimination. For instance, it is
widely believed among North American evidence-based theories that one of the sole reasons for
the continuation of racist mentalities lies in the continuation of segregated residential areas.
Whereas, in Brazil, segregated residences are only evidence of class differences and therefore do
39

not actually make race the independent factor,

In the U.S. model, the issue has been

approached through a capitalist “meritocracy” approach in which the hardest-working or the
most intelligent members of society are rewarded. This concept has shown flaws, though, in the
ways in which merit is determined such as test scores for college entrance. These scores often
reflect intellectual ability much less than they reflect an individual s ability to pay for test
preparation or better education. On the other hand, a much more socialist approach would be a
quota system. The first response from a more liberal capitalist to the quota system is that the
necessary competition for jobs is eliminated allowing a persistence of racial thinking due to the
perceptions of“hand-out”jobs. This system is more quickly accepted in Brazil in which it is
believed that social networks created by class are more often determinants of access to jobs or
education. Thus, it is more accepted to institute quota systems to ensure that classes with less
40

access to necessary social networks and outlets have equal opportunities.

39
40

This Brazilian

Telles, Edward. Race in Another America. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004. 2-3.
Telles. 260.
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ideology is much more similar to Castro’s and has been referred to at times as “Latin American
Exceptionalism” in which it is believed that racism is merely a product of attribution of
differences to race rather than to their actual cause which is believed to be class differences.
This is attributed to the Latin American nations’ higher levels of race mixing through
intermarriage and an acceptance of ethnicity as a continuum ranging from the “whitest” white to
the “blackest” black rather than the “one drop rule” accepted in the U.S. Due to this much less
definable nature of racial categories in Latin America,the tendency has been to turn to a class41

based solution as it is believed to be a much more salient factor,

These exceptionalists would

argue that racism does not exist in a society where race mixing is occurring and that the only
possible problems are created through class differences. This ideology has generally become
accepted by those claiming Latin American nations such as Brazil as racial democracies, bereft
42

of the kind of racism present in the U.S. and only struggling from inequality created by class.
Fidel Castro’s rise to power brought with it the greatest changes in race policy and race
relations in the history of Cuba. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, his arrival on the Cuban scene
was marked by a very segregated racial picture:
“Racial barriers were particularly visible in areas of social life, in which open
racial segregation was not uncommon. Blacks and mulattoes were discriminated
against in luxury hotels, restaurants, cabarets, bars, beaches,^d social clubs.
Their children could not attend the best private schools even if they had the
financial means to afford them. Segregation was also evident in some public
spaces such as the central parks of several towns across the island. Blackness
remained a formidable barrier against social ascent and mobility, particularly in
«43
the higher strata of society.
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In the same way that the original revolutionaries in the 19^ century used the racial
landscape in their favor, it would turn out to be a picture that he could manipulate to serve in
many ways to be an ally on many different fronts. Castro’s race policy showed great fluidity as
he made a very calculated determination of what would bring him the greatest amount ofsupport
from the greatest number of people. Through strong oration and publication coupled with highly
generalized policies, Castro was able to say almost whatever he wanted about the status ofthe
race situation in Cuba. Therefore, the first section of this chapter will focus on Castro
introducing his ideas on race through a series of speeches. The second part will demonstrate a
focus on using the “Cuban miracle” to show superiority over enemy nations who, according to
the revolutionary government, were still failing in their own pursuits of racial equality. The last
section will focus on the peak of Castro’s successes as well as a look at the 1981 census data to
determine if it implies the same successes by comparing ethnicity percentages of the population
in education and labor.
Through the first months of his ascent to power Castro worked very hard to maintain a
general silence on the race issue while still claiming a desire to create a singular Cubanness.
He did not, though, immediately explain what that singularity would look like or how it would be
achieved. This silence would become a hallmark of many of Castro s policies as the divisive
race issue was avoided in times when consolidating power was most needed. In fact, there
would be another three months until he even mentioned the race situation publicly. Finally, on
March 22, 1959, Castro made his first statements regarding race in Cuba and his plans to unify
the races of the country, One of the battles which must be increasingly and daily emphasizedis that which will end racial discrimination in labor—Of all the forms of racial discrimination.
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7,44

the worst is that which limits Cuban Negroes’ access to workplaces,

He went on to state that

racial prejudices were manifested in two ways in Cuba:
“The one practiced in cultural and recreational resorts and that practiced in
workplaces
Whereas the first limits entry into certain circles, the second is a
thousand times more cruel, for it limits access to the centers where one earns a
living; it limits the possibilities of satisfying personal needs.” ^
Furthermore, he explained that the root of the prejudices lay in the fact that schools
remained segregated:
Negroes and whites have been educated separately. Yet, in the small public
schools Negroes and Whites are not separate. In the small public schools Whites
and Negroes learn to live together as brothers. If they are together at school, they
can be so afterwards in the recreational centers and everywhere else. But if they
are educated separately and the aristocracy does educate its children apart from
the Negro—it is logical that later on Negroes and Whites cannot attend the same
cultural and recreational centers together. What is to be done? Simply to umfy our
public schools so that later the white man and the black man^will be in a
position to earn their living together at the same workplaces.
Castro believed that by pronouncing that there would be no more public segregation or
discrimination against anyone on racial grounds that he could end all racial prejudices that were
still maintained in the country:
“[It should not] be necessary to legislate against an absolute prejudice. What we
need is to curse and condemn such men who, because of ancient vices and
prejudices, show no scruples in discriminating against and ill-treating Cubans
because of their lighter or darker hue—It’s unnecessary to decree legal sanctions
or draft a law to support a campaign for the consumption by Cubans of national
products. By the same token, we are going to put an end to racial discrimination
in workplaces by launching a campaign against such an odious and repulsive
system. The slogan will be: “Opportunity to work to all Cubans, without
discrimination of race or sex.”....Thus, step by step, we will be forging a new
fatherland.7,47
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This ‘"new fatherland” would prove to be much more difficult to ‘Torge” than he had ever
imagined. He had now publicly announced that a racial discrimination actually existed and that
he believed it could be ended through a few quick measures and a general belief across Cuba that
every Cuban was now equal. It is important to note the reasons he stated that the discrimination
existed and the ways in which he claims it could be remedied. He stated that there is
discrimination in the workplace, in social arenas, and in public schools. It is interesting that he
did not mention that there were any existing racial problems within the governmental structure.
This diversion will be addressed later. Through a very aggressive approach to, what could be
called, “zero balancing” everyone in the country by creating a classless and equal playing field,
Castro believed, or at least claimed to believe, that there would be no way that racial prejudices
could be maintained.
He began by working through the areas that could most easily be influenced by
government intervention. These were the beaches and social clubs of the country in which racial
discrimination was maintained through charging high membership fees and restricting access to
private beach areas. Castro again completed an impressive balancing act by stating that the
„48

people” would have access to “the sand and the sea only,

In this manner, he was able to avoid

dealing with integrating the elite social clubs immediately and still allow the have-nots greater
access to the best beaches in Cuba.
This model of policy seems to become more and more prevalent in Castro s declarations
as he worked to develop a society in which he could claim that there was no longer white or
black...only Cubans. Furthermore, this erasing of color must be done in a way that allowed
blacks to maintain the idea of“the revolution is for us,” and for the whites to remain confident
48
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that their place at the top of at least the class hierarchy was not going to be shaken. This part of
Castro's policy was much more challenging for him. After his speeches about opening the clubs
to "‘the people,” there began what one would describe as “a general uproar” from the well to do
neighborhoods of Havana, Santa Clara and Camagiiey. ‘The counter-revolution....disseminated
the rumor that Fidel Castro had invited black men to invade the country’s aristocratic sanctuaries
to dance and revel with the vestal virgins who, up to that moment, had managed to avoid the
,49

terrible contact with black skin.’

This uproar was accompanied by a number of whites leaving
50

the country because Castro had made the blacks “impossible” as many of them stated.
Furthermore, the uproar was not relegated to white counter-revolutionaries. In fact, some
mulattoes who stood in strong support of the revolution found themselves ironically against
integrative measures,

Well-to-do mulattoes who had earned a pass into whiteness in Cuba’s

socio-racial hierarchy through education,“decency” and income perceived the crumbling of
,ol

racial barriers as a threat to their precarious social position,

Castro’s project was indeed

struggling to find a foothold of much needed support to undertake such a major project. He
would have to respond with another flick of his charismatic magical wand to pull support back
into his corner.
On March 25, 1959, only three days after his original statements, Castro quickly cleared
up any doubts that whites may have had about the future of their position in society. Through a
television press conference Castro further explained what he meant to do through his race
policies. He began by condemning any forms ofracism and racist behavior. His tone, though,
seems to point to a much different attitude when he addresses blacks later in the speech saying:
49
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‘There is fear that by taking up the defense ofthe Negro the latter will become a
threat to the rest of Cubans and that Negroes will no longer be respectful. I say
that such fears are false because I know Cubans. I know how they react when
told the truth and I know how they react when it comes to justice. I am perfectly
sure that more than ever—precisely because with greater honesty than ever before
their call for justice is being defended—Cuban Negroes will be even more
respectful than ever. They are conscious that not to be so would give the enemies
of the Revolution cause to attack them. They will be more respectful in order not
to give any pretext to those who are saturated with prejudices. They will be even
more respectful so as not to give the least pretext to anyone to combat our task,
our revolutionary task on their behalf. Negroes will be more respectful than they
have ever been, because they will want to give no pretext whatsoever to hinder
the work that the Revolution is doing to create a greater fraternity and
,,52
understanding among Cubans.
Though strongly favoring racial desegregation, Castro had taken a tone that Moore went
as far as to criticize as “white liberal paternalism.” His statements were seemingly altruistic, but
his methods and tone unfortunately implied a much different attitude toward race. “It was out of
the question for Blacks themselves to define the content of their own oppression, or define the
„53

terms of their ethnic emancipation,

There seems to be a strong disconnect between those in

power and those being “fought for” that is remarkably paternalistic in nature. Carlos Moore
quotes David Booth as having understood the situation when he stated:
“In those two speeches in the early months of 1959 Fidel Castro not only
identified the aspirations of his movement in relation to domestic racial
discrimination but also established the limits beyond which it could go.
Henceforth, he referred to the color problem in his speeches only in passing and
implying that, with the campaign to end racism in workplaces and^social centers
completed, there was little if anything that remained to be done.
Thus, a flurry of discussion on race had erupted in Cuba and would lead to some of the
most focused debate and writing that had taken place on the subject in the nation’s history.
Many political and social groups began to join in Castro’s campaign against racism in a massive
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popular effort. A group was created called the Movement of National Integration that would
work across the country through smaller assemblies in provinces, municipalities, and
workplaces. Afro-Cuban clubs such as the Provincial Federation of Societies organized talks by
white government officials in their meeting places to discuss racial discrimination and
unemployment. Many Groups such as the communist Partido Socialista Popular, the Socialist
Youth, the Masons, schoolteachers’ groups, the Catholic Workers Youth, and others began to
make public announcements and publish materials supporting Castro’s plans. Castro’s officials
even commissioned a group of psychiatrists to study the psychological dimensions of the
55

problem and publish their findings.
The goals of the revolution focusing on race were not limited to Castro. Some of his
highest ranking advisors began to make speeches across the country. Raul Castro and Che
Guevara made speeches to worker’s rallies saying,“Our revolution will wage the final battle
against the ill-fated prejudice of racial discrimination” and that “Slavery did not end in Cuba
until January 1, 1959. By July of 1959, Castro went as far as to state that through “intelligent
„56

measures” Cuba was “approaching a process of abolition of racial prejudices.
Over the next three years Castro began to dramatically change the landscape ofthe Cuban
society. After integrating the beaches he went after the elite social clubs. Some ofthese clubs
were openly discriminatory, others discriminatory by maintaining membership fees that were
impossible for lower class (mainly black) members of society to pay. A great example of
Castro’s desegregation of social clubs is evidenced in his treatment of the Havana Biltmore. The
club had many wealthy foreign members and even earned a foreign name. Castro sent a strong
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signal pointing to his intentions for the revolution by expropriating the club and naming it a
circulo social obrero and created a new quota system for members in which, by the 1960s, 55
percent of members were earning less than $100 a month. He had created a place that served
“the workers” with the lowest incomes. He demanded that the same be done across the country
and 13 circulos were created by October 1961.
His masking of the expropriations of the clubs as merely to serve the lower income
groups was not so effective, though, when the regime began to move past some ofthe most
expensive clubs and also began working through many ofthe worker s clubs. Cubanelco, a club
that belonged to the electrical workers, was highly segregated regardless of the fact that it was in
no way made up of elites. This distinction points to evidence of the racial issue transcending
class relations. An “Integration Committee” was formed within the electrical workers union
whose goal it was to break down this segregation under the argument that. It is not fair, that
those who face death together at the top ofthe electric posts cannot have leisure together in a
club that belongs to all.” The club members responded very quickly by suggesting that a new
club be built that would create a place for black workers to have leisure time, and still maintain
the color line. The response from Afro-Cuba workers as well as journalists was in no way
favorable. In a matter of months the club was expropriated by the state and soon became another
57

workers social circle.

Castro still believed strongly, though, that the greatest need for integration lay in the
workforce and educational institutions. He launched a massive literacy campaign aimed at
raising Cuban literacy rates overall, but the impact was felt most strongly by the black population
as it made up the lowest and most undereducated classes. There was a massive push to lower
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rents across the country to quickly redistribute housing in the country. Castro went as far as to
suggest moving the capital from Havana to Santiago de Cuba which was a majority Afro-Cuban
58

city.

The march towards a racially free Cuba was pressing forward and its next step would
take it into Cuban businesses. The process was not nearly as simple as simply redesigning park
landscapes to remove the racially defined areas. The state began creating employment
opportunities that had never been available to Afro-Cubans in the past. Now there were
positions available in banks, retail stores, and cigarette factories that Blacks had never held.
Furthermore, in some industries, the state did not have to intervene at all as some ofthem began
59

to create new policy requiring quotas of Black hires.
In other sectors of the economy the regime’s goals required much greater intervention.
There were not only structural issues due to the fact that there was now a huge demand for jobs
without a giant increase in the job market, but there were historical issues as well. Many
businesses had developed hiring systems in which greater priority was given to sons and
relatives. This system allowed a much greater control over the types of hires a company was
making. There were “job seeker” lists that would almost never include blacks in order to
maintain a segregated workforce. Blacks would rarely even apply for these jobs as they knew
that they would almost never be hired. The government found a way around directly requiring
quota systems for hiring. Instead, it devised a system in which all hires were handled through
60

the Ministry of Labor.
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The government created the Organic Law of the Ministry of Labor in January 1960
requiring all hiring to be done through the Ministry of Labor. Thus, all jobs could be given with
‘‘justice and equality.” Through the new system, the ministry conducted censuses to determine
the number, skills, place of residence, family income, and needs ofthe unemployed. Next, a
national list ofjob seekers was created with each job seeker receiving a randomly assigned
number. There were no hires allowed outside ofthe ministries discretion or that were not from
the national job seeker registry. The official line was that “This way,the Revolutionary
Government will eliminate completely all sorts of discrimination in certain labor sectors,

One

writer commented,“Take an example...The proprietor from a barbershop in a lush hotel like the
Havana Libre

would never has considered hiring a colored barber before the revolution. But
^^61

the decision is no longer his.
Cuba had never looked as it did now. There was an entirely different atmosphere in
which blacks and whites were educated, worked,and held leisure time together. There now
existed the “ideal of brotherhood” in which no true Communist could be a racist. The
government and its followers proclaimed the racially free Cuba and denounced the white, proYankee, antinational bourgeoisie that had fled the country, There was such a strong belief in
the ideal that the Second Declaration of Cuba issued in 1962 claimed that the revolution had
“eradicated discrimination because of race or sex” in Cuba. Castro maintained that all racial
62

discrimination had been destroyed along with all class privileges.
Castro and his government believed that their goals at home were complete and that it
was time to begin spreading the Cuban dream to the rest ofthe world. He surprised the U.S.
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government by announcing that he would be attending the U.N/s General Assembly in
September 1960. Its response was to limit the delegation to Manhattan and house them in the
Sherboume Hotel which was reportedly run by a hostile management. Furthermore, a small
flurry of media activity produced stories of the delegation plucking chickens and cooking on
camp stoves in their hotel rooms. Castro decided to take the treatment an opportunity for a
strong and memorable response. Upon suggestion oftwo of his leading advisors, he moved his
entire delegation to Harlem reportedly saying,“jVamos a darle un gran golpe a los Americanos!
63

(We will deal the Americans a strong blow!).
Castro had created the perfect opportunity to make a public appearance from the
“people’s” side of town and use it as a platform to discuss Cuban gains in race relations while
pointing out the failures of the U.S. Immediately Castro had made friends with black America
by making such a bold statement in such an intense period for race relations in the U.S. The
move was highly publicized by the propaganda machines in Cuba as they told the story ofthe
“Cuban Miracle” and its spectacle in the U.S. Some news papers reports stories of New York
police attacking blacks outside of Castro’s Hotel Theresea in Harlem as they shouted We want
Castro.

,64

Raul Castro directed the Cuban people’s attention to the fact that Fidel, who had

opened hotels for all was kicked out of a hotel in the U.S. and only found help from the black
population. He gave a speech connecting all facets of Cuban foreign policy between Africa, the
U.S. and Afro-Cuba saying:
“The Cuban nation knows that among its people there flows a fraternity based on
blood kinship and identity with those who are their brothers and who are fighting
European colonialism and imperialism in revolutionary Africa. The people of
Cuba today unite in grateful solidarity with the entire American people whose
63
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friendship they want to develop, but especially with our twenty million black
American brethren who are the most exploited and humiliated of all. To them go
.,65
out our friendship and solidarity.
Castro remained hidden in the hotel for an entire day in order to allow time for his next
move to arrive. A call was put in to Havana to send Maj. Ju^ Almeda Bosque a black chief of
the army. He was quickly sent to New York and ushered directly to Castro’s side to join the
previously all-white delegation. Upon his arrival, Castro walked onto his balcony waving to the
masses below with his arm around Almeida. The crowd erupted. Castro then suggested that
Almeida mingle with the crowds. The next day, the Cuban newspapers ran the headline,
..66

“Thousands of Americans Cheered Almeida While He Walked Around Harlem,

Castro had

created the one of the greatest propaganda moments of his career. He would later be visited in
Harlem by Nikita Kruschev and other non-aligned members pointing towards the goals of his
next few years in power.
These goals became evident through his presence in Africa. He gave a five hour speech
to the General Assembly on September 26 detailing his plans for Cuba and connecting its plight
with that of Algeria and the Congo. Lastly, he announced that Cuba was on the side of the
Algerian people and the Negroes ofthe Union of South Africa:
“The Africa we see represented here by leaders like Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou
Toure, the Africa of Nasser’s Arab world [is] the true Africa, the oppressed
continent, the exploited continent, the continent which was the birthplace of
millions of slaves, this Africa whose past is so full of anguish.^ To this Africa we
have a duty: we must save it from the danger of destruction.”
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Thus, Fidel had fully displayed his goals and his methods for reaching them. He would
continue to defame the U.S. using references to his successes concerning race in Cuba and
pointing to the U.S. failures. At the same time, the ideologies that he had shown towards AffoCubans were to be directed towards the black continent itself. He jumped into both pursuits
quickly and with all the flair that he had become so famous for.
The black nationalist movement in the U.S. provided a great deal ofammunition for his
anti-American campaigns. As the massive Civil Rights movements began to unfold in the
United States, Castro became more and more interested in how he might benefit by a United
States tom apart by racial struggle. He began to involve himself in as many ways as possible in
the black nationalist movement. Throughout the most tense periods ofthe U.S. situation, a few
68

radicals from the black nationalist movement sought asylum in Cuba,

Castro welcomed them

with open arms. The greatest publicity of these interactions came through the Black Panthers
connections with Castro and their growing fascination with socialism.
Major players in the Black Panthers movement such as Huey Newton and Angela Davis
69

travelled to Cuba to see the ‘‘social miracle” that had taken place there.

They returned to the

U.S. invigorated with a new hope for socialism and its ability to change the racial landscape of a
country. Others, though, such as Stokely Carmichael and Robert Williams were less convinced.
Upon deciding to live in China rather than Cuba, Williams wrote an internationally distributed
newsletter claiming, that power in Cuba was controlled by a “white petit bourgeoisie. His
statements came five years after he had first arrived in Cuba in exile and called it. The mirror of
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>.70

the future.

Carmichael went to Cuba expecting to see the “miracle” and returned disenchanted

with socialism arguing that,“Communism is not an ideology fitted for black people, period....the
ideologies of communism and socialism speak to class struggle....[Neither] communism nor
»71

socialism...speak to the problem of racism,

Angela Davis, though, made a very strong

response to Carmichael's speech after attending saying,“His speech was all the more disturbing
because I knew that he had been in Cuba the preceding summer and had been warmly received
wherever he went. I knew for a fact that Cuba had unequivocally demonstrated to him that
»72

socialism alone could liberate black people.
Though Castro did receive a strong blow from the statements of a few of the exiles,
overall, their presence in the country was an outstanding tool. Castro was able to point all
attention at the situation in the United States and away from the situation in Cuba. He had
generally closed the case on race in Cuba after his reforms in 1962 so the U.S. situation could not
have come at a better time. The ways in which he shunned the race discussions about his own
country, though, are some of the most discussed policies that he ever employed. Castro did
whatever possible to maintain that the problem did not stem from race, but from class. Thus, he
believed that his policies that would create an equal class situation would erase any visible
existence of race other than skin color. Therefore, he began to count any discussion of race or
racial discrimination as counterrevolutionary and did everything possible to eradicate any
discussion of that nature. These ideas drew a very strong correlation with those ofthe original
Cuban revolutionaries discussed earlier such as Jose Marti who had claimed that there was no
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white or black only Cuban. The policy creates a very difficult situation in which there is no way
to make any sort of racial discrimination claim.
The excited discussion and debate of the 1959-1962 period abruptly ended as any
discussion of race began to disappear from the public sphere. An interview conducted in 1968
with an Afro-Cuban stated,“The problem in Cuba is that there is a taboo on talking about
„73

racism, because officially it does not exist anymore,

By 1961 Castro and his team had fully

deemed their revolution a “socialise revolution and therefore had to maintain the attitude that
there were no longer racial differences. These attitudes were expected to just disappear through
the zero balancing of the economy in which, generally, all job opportunities and incomes would
become equal. There still remained a group of Afro-Cuban intellectuals that desired to continue
to write about the racial situation in Cuba, but there was no longer a forum to do so as all media
was now state-controlled. Furthermore, all racially defined organizations such as the National
Federation of Societies(a political awareness group) and the Afro-Cuban club Atenas and many
other expressions of black culture were slowly removed from the society. The Afro-Cuban
societies were dismantled through a series of motions carried out under the pretext of a sort of
audit designed to remove groups that were not following procedures pertaining to tax and filing.
These groups were broken down by sweeping governmental action against many organizations
such as civic or mutual aid societies. The revolutionary government closed over 170 ofthese
organizations that were deemed contrary to the direction of the revolution publishing the
74
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Thus, a closing of the Cuban side of racial battles and an opening of attention towards the
U.S. struggle revealed an interesting irony in the government’s ideas on race policy. This irony
would be evident in even more ways as the 1980s approached and then even greater during the
economic crisis of the 1990s. The 1980s were opened with a surprising move on the part ofthe
government as census data including racial data was produced. These data were the first to be
published since Castro had taken power because the 1970 data did not include ethnicity numbers.
This is not to say that the 1970 questionnaire did not include questions regarding race, though.
The data was just never published. All other data collected from the 1970 census was published
except the race data. In fact, Lourdes Casal, a black Cuban scholar, reported going to the
National Archives of Cuba in 1970 and finding that all data collected on race in the 1970 census
75

had disappeared.

Thus, the 1970 data remains a complete mystery and, interestingly enough, the 1981
census data revealed another mystery. This time, the data collected on race was included. The
numbers regarding education and the labor market show a great progress in equalizing the racial
landscape. There is even evidence in which the portion of black population that had graduated
high school was even higher than that of the white percentage. The data is remarkable in that it
gives evidence that the disparities between white and black portions are never more than 1.5%, a
number that is very respectable even among much more developed nations:
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1981 Census Data
Territory,
Skin Color
Total
White
Mulatto
Black

Entire

Percent
Total

Country
9.723, 605
6,415,468
2,125,418
1, 168, 695

100%
66%
22%
12%

Urban

6,712,030
4, 394,600
1,394, 184
913,434

Percent
Total
100%
65%
21%
14%

Rural

3,011,575
2,020, 868
731,234
255,261

Percent
Total
100%
67%
24%
8%
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Percent of Population Aged 25 or Over Having Completed High School or College in 1981
Whites

Blacks

Mulattoes

High School

9.9

11.2

9.6

College

4.4

3.5

3.2

The total percentages of the population, though, have been scrutinized with great interest
by a large body of researchers. It seems like there is very little consensus as to the actual
number. Each study has returned very different responses ranging from a total Afro-Cuban
descent of around 33.9% (the actual 1981 census data)^* to numbers as high as 70%(the 1983
79

French yearbook Quid).

The revolutionary government has even made some remarks of its

own regarding the numbers that bring them even further into question. In an interview with
foreign journalists that was not published in Cuba, Fidel even stated,“African blood flows in the
.,80

veins of half of Cuba’s population,

Another of Castro’s advisors Walterio Carbonnell

confirmed the statement estimating that the Cuban Blacks made up at least 50% of the
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population also stating that within Castro's inner circle it was believed that Cuba had a “colored
majority. He explained that this belief was generally decided to be a taboo that was not
81

discussed.

The contradictions in the numbers lead to many questions, but the manner stated in

the Cuban Census of enumerating the ethnicity is even more circumspect.
The enumerators did use one of the two required techniques for counting ethmcity by
choosing to allow the counter to determine the race of each person counted saying,“El
enumerador tenia las instrucciones de anotar sin hacer la pregunta a las personas presentes
durante la entrevista."^“(The enumerator had instructions to note [the race] vdthout asking the
persons present during the interview.) The problem with this method of enumerating is that it
does not allow those interviewed to counter the perception of his or her race. This kind of data
collection is especially troublesome in Latin America due to the broad levels of miscegenation
that make race very difficult to define. Presumably, in order to combat this problem the
government also included the line,“Las categorias se referian al concepto que entiende
comunmente la poblacion y no reflejan realmente razas o color,

(The categories referred to

the population’s commonly understood concept and do not really reflect race or color). It is hard
to begin to guess what the census bureau had in mind by stating that the numbers did not reflect
races or color. It does lead to various assumptions about what the revolution wanted portrayed.
The numbers regarding participation in the labor force only line up with acceptable
representation of the population if the numbers of the population are what the census says they
are.
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The credibility of Latin American census data has been studied by Latin American
historians for decades. The difficulty in studying the data is always attributed to the race
continuum that remains prevalent in most Latin American societies. It has been very difficult to
make comparisons across countries and many times even within countries due to the constant
changing of the manner in which race data is collected. ‘The criteria employed have differed
from census to census, but it is obvious that cultural and social characteristics by and large have
played a much greater role than the phenotype of the individual,

This information is helpful

in understanding the statement that the numbers “do not really reflect race or color.” Race data,
therefore, has not been studied as evidence of changing phenotypes or genetic compositions, but
rather the changes in the ethnic groups created by shifting concepts of race and its impact

on

political policies. These forms of study have been applied across Latin America to study the
effects of policy changes on indigenous populations in much of Central America and on the
black/white question in Brazil. The importance applied to the data is in the comparison of
different ethnic groups to the rest of the population, but also generally understands that

some

changes are created through acculturation which continues to be a contributing factor through
85

miscegenation.

These studies all seem to remain accurate when applied to the Cuban situation.

There are certainly deductions that can be made through attention to race data, but the accuracy
of the data will always remain in question as long as there is no clear way to define race and that.
as evidenced by myriad scholars still remains a highly elusive term.
If one was to follow the numbers from many of the third party estimates of the Cuban
ethnicity percentages, the picture would show a gross underrepresentation in many fields of the
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society. There must have been some indicators apparent to Castro and his leadership that the
situation was not taken care of because after almost a 25 year silence on the issue, he re-opened
the issue of race in the Third Congress for the Communist Party of Cuba in 1986. Castro stated
that, leadership should “duly reflect the ethnic composition of our people” and that the
»?86

promotion of blacks, “must not be left to chance,

He then asked that new affirmative action

type policies be enacted to bring in more Afro-Cubans, women,and youth into the party.*’ Thus,
Castro had begun to once again accept that there was an undeniable black presence in the country
and that a direct equalization of the economy was not going to create the kind of broad
representation in all fields of the society that he had hoped for. He had also abandoned his
original ‘‘no hay raza” stance by directly pointing to the absence of Afro-Cuban representation in
the upper echelons of the Cuban government. Thus, Castro demonstrates a veritable shift in his
ideology. He has realized that a strict adherence to silence on racial issues has not been fiilly
successful and shows that he is not above tempering his policy to pursue greater

success.

These policy changes did see some progress as a shift occurred in the black
representation in the Cuban parliament. In 1986, the total representation of Afro-Cubansjumped
a remarkable 89.1% to an all-time high of 35.5%. According to the census data taken five years
88

earlier, the representation was well above the total percentage of the Afro-Cuban population.
Again though, it is important to remember that those numbers have been highly criticized. Also,
by 1991, during what is referred to as the “Special Period” which will be discussed later, the
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number fell back to 20% below its height from five years before.

These shifts in representation

become more and more e\ ident as the economic crisis grew and will be looked at in depth in tlie
next chapter.
The government was not the only place that the representation of race seemed a little
inconsistent, fhere are many reports of an overabundance of Afro-Cubans represented in the
prisons as well as in the poorest housing areas. One of the main reasons for the prison situation
has been attributed to a statement in the Cuban penal code of 1979. This code includes a clause
relating to individuals with a "social proclivity" to commit crimes. This clause allowed anyone
with behavior "manifestly against the norms of socialist morality to be jailed. Therefore, police
were able to arrest anyone they deemed "socially dangerous." The problems with this measure
are obvious, but they are even more troubling when one looks to the number of individuals jailed
under the peligrosiciaci law. A 1987 study commissioned by the Cuban attorney general showed
that Afro-Cubans had made up 78% of the 643 "social danger cases submitted to the Havana
90

City courts between May and December of 1986.
These small but highly contradictory statements and policies become more and more
evident as the revolutionary government's grip on the Cuban economy begins to falter during the
Special Period. Much like the U.S., Cuban policy makers realized that changes could be made to
eliminate the greatest public and social barriers, but the underlying racist mentalities would be
much harder to affect through policy-making. It would be naive to suggest that the government
failed altogether in their struggle to eliminate institutionalized racism. On the other hand, it
seems that the Incredible progress made remained relegated to the realms ot the social sphere, the

89

Sawyer. 71.

90

De la Fuente, Alejandro and Alejandro Vazquez. "La peligrosidad en ciudad de la Habana (1986). Unpublished
report to the office of the Attorney General. 1987. Quoted in De la Fuente. 315.

40

job sector, and education. Areas such as housing and wealth distribution where there was still
work to be done across the country remained highly segregated. These inequalities were only
exacerbated by the onslaught of the economic depression of the Special Period. Though the
revolutionary government had made incredible changes to the racial landscape, it was still clear
that all was not accomplished. Castro, though, does not cling to a solely class-based ideology
when this inequity becomes apparent. He makes a shift to what Edward Telles called a
91

“Universalist Mantra” in which racial ideology is no longer solely class-based or race-based.
Castro realized that by merely restructuring the economic classes ofthe nation, there still
remained racist attitudes and evidences of discrimination. Therefore, he began to make a shift to
an acceptance of the existence of race through its appearance in census data as well as his
admissions in the Third Congress and made policy shifts directly related to reshaping the racial
stratification of the society.
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Chapter 3
Race Policy and the Special Period
The Special Period in Cuban history is defined as the period following the fall ofthe
Soviet Union in 1989. Due to the U.S. trade embargo and the strength ofthe Soviet Union, Cuba
had developed a very strong dependency on the Soviet Union. Its entire economy was held up
by the Soviet Union and various partners in Eastern Europe. As this market collapsed, Cuba was
left with almost no way to trade internationally and its economy went into a depression so deep
that between 1989 and 1993 the gross domestic product declined by 40%.^^ The sudden
dramatic change in the economy put a very heavy and unexpected burden on the revolutionary
government. This burden acted as a litmus test for the true status of race relations in the country
and revealed that the underlying racial inequalities that had been changed,smoothed, or covered
over by socialist policies were much greater than expected.
The stagnant economy forced the Cuban government to begin seeking new policies to
stabilize it. These policies did allow for some levels of recovery, but they came with the price of
greater inequalities than had been experienced earlier in the revolutionary period. One ofthe
most dramatic of these policies was the legalization of U.S. dollars. Under the current socialist
mantra of a society that was unaffected by race and only class, any changes in the economy
should have affected members of all races. In the case of family remittances, though, there was a
grave inequality. The problem was the massive difference in the racial structure of Cubans
living in the United States. The 1990 U.S. census stated that the Cuban immigrant base in the
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U.S. was 83.5% white.

rhcrcfore. the percentage of people in Cuba receiving dollar

remittances was equally off balance in favor of whites.
1 he importance of having access to US. dollars goes well beyond its stability compared
to the Cuban peso. "In a sense. Cuba today has not one population, but two: those with dollars
..1)4

and those without.

There is a major difference between the items available for purchase to

those holding dollars and those who do not. Some medicines, clothing, and foods are only
available for purchase with dollars.

The vast importance of owning dollars has created the

largest inequality gap since the advent of Castro's government. The fact that dollars are most
often gained through family remittances has created vast differences in the black/white sphere
due to the racial composition of the Cuban immigrant population in the U.S. This problem is
compounded by the inequalities of employment in the new tourist industry that was quickly
developed to assist in pulling the economy out of depression.
The tourist industry has created the second most important source of dollars for Cubans.
For the first four years after the fall of the Soviet Union a system of “tourist apartheid was
created in which some hotels and special "dollar stores” were available only to tourists. The
situation did not last long, though, because, in 1993, a large group of Cuban citizens began
breaking into stores in the new hotels to loot for food as well as to seek vengeance for their
plight. A riot ensued that had to be quelled by police and even merited an appearance of Fidel
96

himself to be calmed. Shortly thereafter, dollars became legal for all Cubans.
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Now access lo di^llars is gained through either remittances or tourists. Therefore.
employment in the tourist industry is the most sought after in the country. Another inconsistency
in race policy has been created by the tourist industry as well though. Due to the fact that the
new hotels are run by foreign corporations. the>' do not follow the aforementioned hiring laws.
The government is so dependent on the foreign corporations that it has generally been the policy
lo allow the foreign corporations "complete autonomy to select, hire, and when necessary, fire
-‘>7

the hotel's employees,

These shifts have allowed the racial landscape of the tourist sector to

be changed dramatically. Whereas during the 1980s blacks were highly represented in the tourist
industry, it is reported that their numbers have quickly fallen. A 1994 survey revealed tliat
blacks do not have the same employment opportunities as whites in the tourist industry. These
statements have been explained by interviews such as one conducted by Rafael Duharte and Elsa
Santos in 1994 which includes a while female hotel manager's words:
“Yes. it is true, there is a lot of racial prejudice in the tourist sector. I have
worked there for about a year and I know that there is a lot of racism. In my
corporation, for instance, out of five hundred workers there are only five
blacks....'There is no explicit policy stating that one has to be white to work in
tourism, but it is regulated that people must have a pleasant aspect, and blacks do
not have it....It is so rare to find a black woman in tourism that when there is one.
people comment that she must be going to bed with an important boss. The few
black men who work in tourism always perform manual labor, such as driving
trucks or lifting merchandise in the warehouses. They never work directly with
-98
the tourists.
There is a discussed concept of a "good presence" that is generally used to determine
eligibility to work in the tourist industry. It is generally accepted that within the concept it is
believed that "blackness is ugly and that blacks—their formal schooling not withstanding
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proper manners,'cultural lex cT and education in their social relationships.

These statements

are not merely underlying examples of remnant racial prejudices that have carried over from prerevolutionary periods. In fact, it would be short-sighted to call them anything but direct
discrimination on basis of race. In order to maintain the level of needed economic support
Castro and his leadership ha\ e turned from their original policies of creating a raceless economy
to allow some discrimination to take place if it means survival ot the economy.
Further examples of inequalities have even surfaced in the infomial market. The
repressions on small business by the go\ ernment have forced many Cubans to turn to the
informal market. In fact, the informal market has become so prevalent that the government even
has admitted it existed, d’he most common, as well as the most accepted, fomis of illegal trade
usually involve renting rooms to foreigners without licenses or skimming gasoline or foods from
state resources to sell.

100

An interview with a retired official revealed:“We know that the

majority of the population is involved in some form of illegal trade. However, we understand
that some of this activity is necessary given the embargo and the special period for survival and
uoi
comfort of our people.'
Due to their already disadvantaged status, many Afro-Cubans have
turned to the less desirable illegal market opportunities such as petty crime, hustling tourists, and
prostitution, 'fhese practices only serve to proliferate the already strong beliefs among many of
the white population that blacks are more prone to crime. Afro-Cubans on the other hand point
to their lack of dollars and resources as the reason for their inabilities to participate in the more
102

socially accepted sectors of the illegal market.
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Other forms ot' labor discrimination have been evident even outside of the tourism
industry. Cjo\ ernmcni positions arc usuall\' awarded on a "merit system.'' Interviewees report
that more often than not whites are considered more worthv on account of"merit."’ These merits
are awarded throuuli ser\ ice to the re\ olution. It is reportedly not impossible to work hard
enough to be rewarded w iih a position, but it is very difficult for Afro-Cubans. One interviewee
stated."No one will sa\'. 'sou can't have the job because you are black." It is always discussed
in terms of merit. In C’uba and cspeciallv' in Havana, it isn't so much bad to be black, but there
are advantages to being white

rich relatives, perceptions of merit, and many other things you

-103

fhese perceptions of the government's methods tor distributing jobs.

just can't count,

regardless of their validity, seem to be generally accepted and are therefore highly affecting the
ideas of the population towards the government's "equality goals."'
Finally, there continues to be an ovorrepresentation of blacks in the prisons and under
police scrutiny, fhere is a generally^ accepted belief that blacks are more prone to criminality
than whites and are therefore the focus of many police investigations. These beliefs have been
backed up by various interviews as well as in statements from Castro himself. A white female
professional staled that."A lot of stealing was going on and they [Afro-Cubans] were accused.
Fidel offended them by saying something to the effect of'Old Havana is full of Eastern
I 04
delinquents."

Another interviewee described the overt belief that blacks were generally the

cause of crimes in the city,'Tf you describe a crime to someone, the first question they will ask
-105
'

is,'Were they black'.^'
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fhese beliefs make finding employment even more difficult for blacks
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due to the turn ii')\vard a more liberal eeonomy and the cycle of poverty and forced turns to less
desirable employment eontinues.
'I'hese beliels about erimes ha\e forced an apparent turn towards‘’protecting” Havana
from the growing entrance of Afro-Cubans. I'he U.S. State Department issued a Country Report
on Human Rights Practices in C'uba in 2000. The report pointed to the focus on internal
migration and the institution of the 1007 Cuban Decree 217. The government’s stated goal for
the Decree was to slow the increase of migration into the capital city in order to protect it against
the growing stress on inlVastructure. Police were allowed to check an individual’s identification
to determine il' they were li\ing in the cit\ illegally. Any found in violation of the Decree were
fined $ 1 5 and sent home, fhe report also stated that human rights groups have observed that,
while the decree affected migration countrywide, it was targeted at individuals and families,
,106

who are predomincintly of African descent, from the more impoverished eastern provinces.
This focus on controlling the increase of an Afro-Cuban population in the city may point
to part of the reason for the inclusion of the race data in the 1981 as well as the 2002 Cuban
census data. In a country that is supposed to maintain a “colorblind” perspective, there seems to
be a growing attention to the Atro-Cuban population and its movements. Interestingly enough,
the ethnicity data for both censuses was listed by the total population, the urban population, and
H)7

the rural population.

U is important to note also that the 2002 census also included the same

definitions of race with the ironic lines stating, “El enumerador tenia las instrucciones de anotar
sin hacer la pregunta a las personas presentes durante la entrevista,”(The numerator had
instructions to note [the race) without asking the question to the people present during the
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inler\'ievv) and "I.as caractcrislicas sc rcfirieron al conceplo al concepto que entiende
-lOS
(The characteristics referred to the
comunmenle la poblacidn \ no rcflcjan realmcnie razas.
concept that is communalU understood b\ the population and does not really reflect races.)
These points make the data seem less and less credible for two reasons. First, the government is
not allowing the citizens to determine their race. Secondly, it seems that the government is
trying to downplay the data by stating that the numbers do not really reflect race. In a society in
which it is cUiimed that race does not exist, the census reports cannot claim to actually list race.
There is obviously some concern about race on the part of the government, though, because the
data has been collected and published.
Below is the inl'ormtuion on race and region from the 1981 and 2002 censuses fortlie
purpose of comparing the shifts in the population.
1981 Census Data
TerritorySkin Color
Total
White
Mulatto
Black

109

Iditire
C'o untry
9,723. 605
6, 415. 468
2,125, 418
1. 168. 695

Percent
Fotal
1 00%
66%
22%
12%

Urban

6, 712. 030
4, 394. 600
1. 394, 184
913, 434

Percent
Total
100%
65%
21%
14%

Rural

3.011.575
2. 020, 868
731,234
255,261

Percent
Total
100%
67%
24%
8%

1 U)

2002 Census Information
Tin tire
Territory.
Skin Color
Country
Total
White
Mulatto
Black

108
109
110

11. 177.743
7, 271.926
2, 778. 923
1. 126, 894

Percent
I'otal
1 00%
65%
25%
10%

Urban

8. 479,329
5. 522,013
1, 998, 235
959. 081

Percent
Total
100%
65%
24%
11%

Cuba. Censo de Poblacion v Viviendas 2002. Havana; 2002.
Cuba. Censo de Poblacion v Viviendas 1981. Republica de Cuba 1981. 16.12.
Cuba. Censo 2002

Rural

2, 698,414
1,749,913
780,688
167, 813

Percent
Total
100%
65%
29%
6%
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'I hcre seems io be a conceried otTort to map the direction of population movements as
well as control it. Referriitg to the 1 ^>81 information from Chapter 2. the urban Afro-Cuban
population has grown b> o\er b4h.000. Also, the percentage of the Afro-Cuban (black and
mulatto) populaticm li\ ing in urban \ ersus rural areas is 5% greater than in 1981. These shifts.
once again, can be considered to be e\ en greater than the data represents due to the circumspect
nature of the C'uban census data. rhero is dermitely a shift taking place, though, and the
revolutionary go\ ernment seems to be reacting to it through policies such as Decree 217 that
HI

allows police to issue fines to an\one caught li\ ing in Havana illegally,

The numbers are

showing a growth in urban centers (I la\ ana) and the government is creating policy to control that
movement.
'I'hus, the Special Period prompted changes in race policy that undermined the original
goals of Ccistro's administration. Where labor was once fully controlled by the government and
odious discrimination by race in the labor market was eliminated there now stood a very broken
racial landscape in which whites had clearly taken the front seat showing more evidence of the
fact that a solely class-based racial reductionist policy is incapable of changing deeply ingrained
beliefs in people’s hearts. 'I'he legalization of the dollar paved a clear path towards inequality

as

white families in the U.S. sent remittances to their white Cuban counterparts and whites were
given top priority in hiring in the tourist industry. A continuation of racial profiling that had
actually been somewhat prevalent in the time before the Special Period became even more
visible. Overall, many of the laudable gains that the revolution had made in the years prior to the
Special Period were almost imperceptible underneath the massive inequalities that rose to the
foreground of the Cuban society of the 1990s.
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Conclusions
The original goal ol'ihc paper was to siudy the shifts in race policy in Cuba to better
understand the depllis cd’ C'asiro's affects on the racial landscape of Cuba. The three time periods
that were studied ol'l'ercd a broad description of the changes in the racial landscape throughout
the history oi'C'uba with a locus on the time period of Castro's leadership.
I'he llrst chapter oft'ered a \ er\ broad picture of the race situation that Castro encountered
when he began his control of the country. The chapter discussed how racial identity was created
in Cuba through sla\ er> . the independence movement, the U.S. occupation and the period
leading up to C'astro's re\olution. The chapter indicated that Afro-Cubans were allowed much
greater participeUion in the leadership and movements of the country during times of greatest
need. The Afro-Cuban representation in the military, for example, especially in the case of
leaders like Antonio Macco was greatly welcomed. This welcome, though, was not offered
without an overt caution that participation W’ould only be allow'ed to go as far as the white
institutional leadership allowed (as indicated by the shift in white support away from Maceo
even when he was succeeding for the Cuban cause). This ideology is actually somewhat similar
to some of Castro’s ideology.
The second chapter offered a close look at Castro’s sweeping statements regarding race
in the first months of his leadership. This open-armed welcome to Afro-Cuba to take its rightful
seat in the Cuban society seemed remarkably similar to the open arms offered to Afro-Cubans
when they were needed to help win independence just as Castro needed them to consolidate his
power. His promises proved to be generally true, though. In a memorable speech in March
1959, Castro promised to create equality in the social, labor, and educational spheres. He did not
waste time. All three ol'these goals were more or less achieved by 1962. But, in that same year.
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the first of liis odd contradictions bcuan to rise to the surface. Castro had deemed his revolution
socialist and therefore could no longer discuss race as a distinguishing factor in the society. So,
because he had succeeded in creating as close to an equal playing field as he could create, he and
his leadership called the case closed.
Me then proceeds to begin work fighting his archenemy the United States with an
unmatched propaganda campaign. Me housed African American civil rights leaders in Cuba and
showed them the "miracle" he had created convincing most of them to return to the U.S. with a
very leftist leaning ideology. 1 le further carried his banner into Africa as he worked on the side
of the struggling indigenous groups to "free" them from the imperialistic grip of capitalism. The
important note here, though, is that Castro was spending a great deal of time discussing race
issues regarding the U.S. and Africa while at home he was quickly shunning any debate or
representation of race, fhis silence within the country led to an inability of Cubans to really
inspect the state of race affairs in Cuba.
The third chapter revealed the greatest inconsistencies of all as Castro allowed the most
blatant representations of institutionalized racial discrimination to occur in the history of his
leadership. Instead of what would be suspected to be a growth in progress of the leveling of the
racial playing field, there surfaced major inequalities that seemed to have roots that had been
created even during the wonder years of the 1960s and 1970s. These inequalities were
exacerbated by an economy that Castro's leadership could no longer control. Thus, many of the
racial equalities that Castro had originally claimed had been created were revealed to be merely
covered by the zero-balancing of the economy. Furthermore, direct representation of a fear of
the Afro-Cuban population is evidenced by policies aimed at the decentralization of the AfroCubans and close attention to the internal migration of Afro-Cubans from rural to urban areas.
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Furthermore, slatislieal data collected by the Cuban government has fallen under extreme
scrutiny as an estimate as high as a 62% Afro-Cuban population made by the United States
112

Central Intelligence Agcnc\ in contrast to the 3>2% reported by the Cuban government.
If these estimates w ere to be pro\ ed correct, the numbers that the Castro administration
points to regarding emplo\ nient and go\ ernmental participation would look outrageously low.
Instead those numbers are allowed to be \ iewed from the perspective of the Cuban data and are
therefore satisfactor\ .
Fidel C'astro is unden iabl>- one of the most adept politicians in the history of the world at
consolidating support through his policies and speeches. It would also be wTong to suggest that
the revolution did not do auN thing to resoK e to race problem in Cuba. In fact, it could be argued
that Castro's regime did more thait any other single administration in the history of the world to
combat racism (although he also held the luxury of being the longest standing leader of any
country). But, it would also not be fully accurate to suggest that he eradicated racial distinctions
from the Cuban society. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence to conclude that not even
institutionalized discrimination in portions of the labor force or racially based governmental
policy has not been fully eradicated in Cuba. There are inequities in job distribution as well as
policies that are obviously directed at controlling movements of the Afro-Cuban population.
This study could not be fully conclusive due to the shortage of data allowed in and out of
Cuba. In order to fully understand the race situation in Cuba, it would be necessary to have a
much more credible source of information regarding the proportions of ethnicity in the country.
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Also, a subslanlial need tor data collection remains to determine the actual levels of participation
in the economy and go\ernment Atro-Cubans play.
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